The goal of this paper is to re-examine the evidence using newly available data and reconcile some of the contradictory results in this recent literature. We focus on three questions: (1) Did the tax cut cause the surge in dividends or were other factors responsible? (2) Did the tax cut induce substitution of repurchases for dividends, or did total payout rise? (3) Did the tax cut induce more efficient distribution of investment funds across firms?
We classify dividends into regular dividends and special dividends. Regular dividends are periodic and recurrent (in general quarterly), and tend to be very smooth. Special dividends are one-time, non-recurring events.
Three events are particularly relevant for our analysis. First, the reform was initially proposed on January 7, 2003. Second, the tax cut was officially signed into law on May 28, It is difficult to make precise inferences about the effect of the dividend tax cut on aggregate amounts because of entry and exit effects and the concentration of the dividend payments distribution. Clearer evidence comes from the time series of regular dividend initiations and terminations, which are unaffected by these econometric issues. Figure 2 shows that initiations surged after the law was enacted. The number of initiations in the three quarters immediately following enactment (2003-Q3, 2003-Q4, and 2004-Q1) are the three highest among the 80 quarters we consider. The spike in initiations dies down rapidly after the tax cut until the Bush election.
In an influential study, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (2001) observed that the fraction of publicly traded firms paying dividends has declined steadily from 1980 to 2000, a trend they term "disappearing dividends." Brandon Julio and David Ikenberry (2004) Controlling for such entry and exit effects (Chetty and Saez, 2005) shows that the increase in dividends starts precisely at the time of the reform once these effects are netted out in any of the samples (core sample, top 3785, or top 1000). Therefore, the pre-reform "reappearing dividends" results of Julio and Ikenberry are due to composition effects, while the post-reform dividend increases are due to active behavioral changes in corporate payout policy.
Two other pieces of evidence (described in Chetty and Saez, 2005) also suggest that the tax reform played a significant role in the recent increase in dividend payouts. First, controlling for observables such as profits, forecasted earnings, industry composition does not affect the results. Second, there is no change in dividend initiations for a "control group" of firms whose primary shareholders are large non-taxable institutions unaffected by the tax cut. However, the magnitude of the response to the tax cut may have been accentuated by other factors such as distrust arising from the corporate scandals that occurred in the early 2000s.
Substitution with Share Repurchases
The efficiency effects of the dividend tax cut depend heavily on whether corporations increased total payout or simply substituted dividends for share repurchases. The most direct and credible way to shed light on the issue of dividend-repurchases substitution is to examine the effect of the tax cut on total payout (dividends plus repurchases). Figure 5 plots the time series of aggregate share repurchases alongside aggregate dividends. Share repurchases have increased sharply since the tax cut, consistent with no substitution. However, in light of the high volatility in aggregate share repurchases over time, it is clearly possible that repurchases could have increased even more absent the tax change. The lack of a stable counterfactual for repurchases makes it impossible to draw any reliable conclusions about the effect of the reform on total payout in the aggregate sample. Controlling for observable variables, removing the largest share repurchasers, or examining other moments of the distribution does not smooth the time series of share repurchases, and hence does generate sharper conclusions (see Chetty and Saez, 2005) . identification problem using alternative methods. They first observe that only 66% of postreform dividend initiators raised total payout in the year they initiated dividends. Second, they find that firms increasing dividends after the reform (in 2003) were less likely to raise total payout and more likely to have repurchased shares prior to increasing dividends than pre-reform dividend increasers (average from 1993-2002). Brown et al. argue that these results "indicate clearly that, for many firms, the increase in dividends came at the expense of repurchases."
There are three concerns with this analysis. First, the presumption that "if no substitution had occurred, 100 percent of the firms that initiated dividends would have increased total payouts" is not necessarily correct. For example, suppose that repurchases are used only to pay for exercised stock options and are unrelated to dividend policy. In this case, there is no substitution between dividends and repurchases. However, a fraction of dividend initiating firms might simultaneously experience sufficient reductions in repurchase levels that total payout would happen to fall. Thus, the finding that only 66% of post-reform initiators raised total payout is uninformative about the substitution issue.
Second, Brown et al.'s comparisons of post-reform dividend increasers with pre-reform increasers are also problematic. Consider a setting where dividend and total payout behavior are determined by two variables: a firm's taste to pay out its earnings (θ) and the dividend tax rate (τ ). Firms who initiated dividends pre-reform presumably did so because they experienced an increase in θ; firms who initiated post-reform did so because τ fell. Given that firms who experience a rise in θ presumably have a greater taste to raise repurchases as well, they are inherently more likely to raise total payout than post-reform initiators, even with zero repurchase substitution. Put differently, the relevant counterfactual here is how total payout by post-reform initiators would have changed had the tax reform not occurred. Brown et al. (2004) proxy for this counterfactual using the behavior of pre-reform initiators. This proxy is problematic because pre-reform initiators are an endogenously selected set of firms who are quite different because they chose to change their dividend policy without a tax cut incentive.
Finally, even ignoring the endogenous sample selection concern, the Brown et al. (2004) analysis may be biased by sharp trends in repurchasing behavior over the period they examine 
Evidence on Allocation Efficiency
While it is difficult to make inferences about changes in total payout, it is possible to shed some light on the effect of the tax cut on allocation efficiency (the efficiency of distribution of investment funds across firms) by examining the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the dividend response. To do so, we divide firms into quintiles of forecasted earnings growth. 4 Figure   7 shows the frequency of regular dividend initiations in these five groups before the reform These results suggest that the dividend tax cut made the capital market reshuffle funds out of lower growth firms. Several studies in the corporate finance literature have argued that free cash flow within such firms is not always put toward value-maximizing ventures because of principal-agent problems. Since the reduction in dividend taxes reduced executives' incentives to hoard earnings, the funds released from these lower-growth firms might have been redirected through the external capital market toward other ventures with greater expected value.
The importance of principal-agent issues in understanding the effects of taxation on corporate behavior is further underscored by evidence that the dividend response was concentrated among firms where the key players (top executives and other large taxable shareholders) were affected by the reform (Chetty and Saez, 2005; Brown et al., 2005) . Motivated by this evidence, in ongoing work (Chetty and Saez, 2006) , we develop a model where executives determine payout policy and have objectives beyond pure profit maximization. We show that dividend taxes affect payout behavior and efficiency in this environment even if the marginal source of funds is retained earnings (as in "new view" models of dividend payments). The analysis of such models of corporate behavior, which depart from neoclassical profit maximization, may shed further light on the efficiency costs of corporate taxation. Notes: Sample for dividends in defined as in Figure 1 . For share repurchases, the sample is limited to those firms that appear in the quarterly compustat database with non-missing share repurchase information (item data93L). 
